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The Role of Sergey Dubinsky in the Downing of MH17

March 2, 2017

By Bellingcat Investigation Team

Translations: Русский

Following the publication of “Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17,” additional information has surfaced that further confirms the identity of Khmuryi as Sergey Nikolaevich Dubinsky, born August 9, 1962. The clearest confirmation of our investigation came courtesy of Russian actor Ivan Okhlobystin, who was photographed with Dubinsky on his Odnoklassniki profile. In a February 16, 2017 op-ed with RT (archive), Okhlobystin confirms that Sergey Dubinsky is indeed the separatist figure who went by the name Khmuryi and Petrovsky while serving under Igor “Strelkov” Girkin in Sloviansk and Donetsk.

“Sergey Dubinsky, with the call-sign Khmuryi — a respected Russian soldier, who honorably devoted his entire life to serve the Fatherland, even when his Fatherland entrusted him with senseless and harmful tasks in a period of social disorder in the mid-90s. He had already retired, but he was once again struck with bad luck: a coup took place in his native Ukraine, and as a soldier, he could do nothing except stand up in defense of the Constitution and joined up with the militia in Sloviansk under the flag of Strelkov.”

Sergey Dubinsky (middle) in Donetsk, Ukraine, in December 2014, photograph uploaded 15 October 2016. Left: Ivan Okhlobystin, Right: Ivan’s wife Oksana Arbuzova.

After the publication of our article, a number of readers commented on how Dubinsky had posted for some time on a message board at Glav.su, where he posted under the username “Нехороший” (Bad) in reference to the username “Bad Soldier” that he used in the Antikvariat forum. Numerous long-time users on the message board, including some separatists, confirmed the identity of Dubinsky/”Bad” in his time posting on the message board. He also made various posts that correspond with the biographical details of Dubinsky, such as an off-hand reference about his birthday that corresponds with Dubinsky’s birthday.

  • On August 2, 2015, Dubinsky confirmed that the recordings with his voice released by the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) on July 18, 2014 were authentic.
  • In an attempt to confirm Dubinsky’s identity, a user asks him what car he often drove while he was in Sloviansk in June 2014. On July 12, 2015, Dubinsky replied that it was a black Peugeot 3008. The same type of car was filmed escorting Buk 332 through Makiivka on July 17, 2014, though this does not mean that Dubinsky was in the car at the time, but rather than it was used by men of the DNR intelligence services.
  • On July 13, 2015, Dubinsky said that he had previously only been seen in a single video from May/June 2014, filmed in Kramatorsk.

Additional information regarding Sergey “Khmuryi” Dubinsky has also emerged since the publication of our article. On February 18, 2017, InformNapalm published an article showing that Dubinsky joined a congress of the “Union of Donbas Volunteers,” which took place on November 4, 2016 in Moscow. Dubinsky himself gave comments to the BBC Russian Service in response to our article. Dubinsky did not refute his identity as Khmuryi, and instead claiming that a Ukrainian Buk was responsible for the downing of MH17, though the location provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense for this supposed Ukrainian Buk shootdown has been thoroughly debunked.

With Sergey Dubinsky’s identity as “Khmuryi” confirmed beyond all reasonable doubt, both in his additional discovered posts and confirmation from his friend Ivan Okhlobystin, we can now provide additional analysis regarding Dubinsky’s role in the transport of Buk 332 on July 17, 2014 through eastern Ukraine. As this analysis will show, Dubinsky was a key–or perhaps even the key–figure in organizing the transport of Buk 332 from Donetsk to a field south of Snizhne on the day of the tragedy. Furthermore, this additional analysis confirms the authenticity of the intercepted telephone conversations involving Dubinsky published by the SBU on July 18, 2014. Some details of these calls were previously under dispute or unclear, such as references to downed jets and Gvozdikas in a call between Dubinsky and “Botsman,” but a closer look reveals that even minor details in the calls can be verified through open source materials.

The following sections will provide both a summary and detailed analysis of the five calls involving Sergey “Khmuryi” Dubinsky published by both the SBU and JIT, along with additional commentary on some of the additional details provided in a slightly extended version of a call published by the JIT.

Dubinsky in Intercepted Calls Published by the SBU

Intercepted phone calls published by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reveal numerous details about Dubinsky’s role around the transport of Russian Buk 332 on July 17, 2014. The day after the downing, the SBU identified Khmuryi (Dubinsky) as “Sergey Nikolayevich Petrovsky, born 1964, officer of the Russian GRU, Igor ‘Strelok’ Girkin’s deputy of intelligence, who was in Donetsk at the time of the intercept.” We now know that some of these details are true, and some are a bit off–namely, the year of birth (1962, not 1964) and his last name (Sergey Nikolayevich Dubinsky, not Petrovsky, which was his pseudonym in the DNR). Additionally, in one uploaded version of the conversations, the SBU duplicated information from a previous call (see summary of the fifth call). The SBU provides the number of the telephone that was intercepted: +38 063 121 3401. Two of the original videos published by the SBU can be accessed here (Ukrainian) and here (English). Dubinsky speaks at the following times in the video: 1:33 – 3:52, 4:15 – 5:22.

Summary of the first call (9:08am):

In the first conversation, Dubinsky speaks with “Buryatik,” a separatist soldier who has never been identified with certainty. Buryatik asks Dubinsky (Khmuryi) where to load a Buk-M1 (which is called a “beauty,” “Buk,” “B,” and “M” at different points), which was taken by Buryatik from an unidentified location to Donetsk. After asking where to unload and hide the Buk from the truck it was towed on, Buryatik confirms to Dubinsky that the Buk came with a crew. Dubinsky tells Buryatik that there is no need to unload and hide it, but instead said that it has to go “to there” now.

Analysis

  • The time of this call (9:08am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video, along with the JIT’s video from March 30, 2015.
  • It is unclear from the call if this “crew” (экипаж) came with the Buk from Russia, was a group of separatist soldiers, or was a mix of the two.
  • The destination for the Buk mentioned by Dubinsky is presumably a field south of Snizhne, or another place meant to provide air defense cover to the area. This is quite logical for the time, as Ukrainian jets conducted airstrikes in the area around Snizhne at that time. The most well known example of this was an airstrike hitting an apartment building in Snizhne on July 15, killing 12 civilians. Satellite imagery further documents the presence of a Su-25 ground attack fighter in the area on July 16, 2014 (see coordinates 47.951409, 38.828687).
  • A video published on March 30, 2015 by the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team reveals a few extra seconds from this call, as detailed at the end of this article.

Summary of the second call (9:22am):

In the second phone conversation, which begins at 2:12 in the embedded video above, Dubinsky agains speaks with Buryatik. He asks if he brought one or two Buks. Buryatik explains that there was a mix-up with the transfer, as they did not have or were not willing to give/loan a second vehicle to transfer another Buk with. “They” unloaded the Buk from the truck they transported it on, and the Buk crossed the border on its own and was then transported with a truck. Dubinsky then tells Buryatik that the Buk will be going to its destination with tanks from the Vostok Battalion.

Analysis

  • The time of the call (9:22am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
  • Dubinsky expected a second vehicle with the delivery, though it is unclear what this would have been. It would be safe to assume that Dubinsky helped coordinate the transfer and use of the Buk, as he had some previous idea about what would be delivered, and Buryatik knew to call him for where the Buk would be moved or hidden.
  • It’s not entirely clear what situation occurred when Buryatik described “the mix-up that they had” (у них там пошла непонятка). It is possible that he expected another transport vehicle to be used to take another Buk, or that “they” would conduct a portion of the transport themselves.
  • The identity of “they” is unclear, referring to those in Russia who brought the Buk to the border. Buryatik never gives many identifying details, but we know that they had contact with the separatists, may have included crew members (see analysis of previous conversation), and they transported the Buk to the border.
  • The exact crossing point for where the Buk crossed the border under its own power (“она своим ходом (…) перешла через полоску”), or where the transport vehicle was parked on the Ukrainian side of the border, is unclear. Of the possible candidates, an illegal border crossing point between Severnyi, Ukraine and Donetsk, Russia at 48.352967, 39.942758 seems most likely. For more information, see page 47 the Bellingcat report “Tracking the Trailers” and pages 11-13 of the Bellingcat report “Russia’s Path(s) to War“.
  • In an interview with the now-defunct separatist news outlet icorpus (but saved on the blog El Murid), Dubinsky mentioned how he was allowed to take 3-4 tanks from the Vostok Battalion on the day of the downing of MH17: “…when I was going to Stepanivka, right before the Boeing crash, [Vostok Battalion commander] Khodakovsky called me for some reason instead of Igor Ivanovich [Girkin, “Strelkov”], and told me: “If you need to, you can take 3-4 of my tanks.” And I took them, because I did need to.
  • The transport of the Buk with the Vostok tanks did not take place exactly as explained. Arnold Greidanus and Ukraine@War (also see here) have done extensive analysis on the Vostok convoy that travelled along roughly the same route as the Buk, but at different times. Two videos of the Vostok convoy can be seen below:

 

Summary of the third call (9:23am):

Dubinsky speaks with a different person, “Sanych,” in the third call, starting at 2:43 in the previous embedded video. The SBU describes him as a fighter of the DNR and a deputy of Khmuryi (Dubinsky). In the call, Dubinsky tells Sanych that “my Buk-M” will go with “your guys,” and that the Buk is on a transport vehicle now. He asks Sanych about where to take it to place it in a military convoy. Sanych says to take it to the Motel roundabout.

Analysis

  • The time of the call (9:23am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
  • Buk 332 was parked at the Motel roundabout for some time (as filmed by a driver in this video), before it left eastward through Makiivka (filmed here), Zuhres (filmed here), Torez (photographed here), and finally Snizhne (filmed here).
  • It is interesting that Dubinsky referred to the Buk as “my Buk,” again indicating that he was a key figure involved in acquiring and transporting the weapon from Russia.
  • A key part of these intercepted calls is how we can see which separatists knew different instructions. Here, Dubinsky does not know where Buk 332 should be taken to send it off in a convoy, but he does know the ultimate destination and that it will be with or near Vostok tanks.

Summary of the fourth call (9:54am):

Dubinsky speaks with a new, unidentified person who is only described as a “DNR terrorist.” Dubinsky tells this person to call a man called “Bibliotekar” (The Librarian), and that he will find “you know what” at the Motel roundabout. The unidentified person affirms that he knows what “you know what” is. Dubinsky then instructs him to take “only those who came back, how ever many you need for the escort, and leave the rest behind here.” He then tells him to go to a spot near Pervomayskoe, and check a map for directions to the area. Once the unidentified soldier reaches the area near Pervomayskoe, Dubinsky tells him to set up and unload the remaining people he has with him. His tasks is to be in reserve and to guard the Buk-M that the person is transporting. He closes the call by saying that a man named Gyurza (The Viper) will also be at this location.

Analysis

  • The time of the call (9:54am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
  • The question of Bibliotekar’s identity has never been answered with any satisfaction. Many have investigated the question, but no one has answered who he is for certain. Some have guessed that he is a Russian soldier, perhaps from one of the intelligence services, though without any specific individual in mind. Others have pointed to Fyodor Berezin, who once served as a Soviet air defense officer, was called the “Russian Tom Clancy” by the New Yorker because of the science fiction and military books he authored, and served as the Deputy Defense Minister in the DNR in 2014. That said, it’s unclear if Berezin was in Donetsk at the time, and may have been in Luhansk, per his own LiveJournal posts. However, it would be a mistake to assume that “The Librarian” must be the call sign for a literary or bookish person–for example, “Bibliotekar” is a type of monster in the popular Ukrainian video game/Russian book series “Metro 2033,” which is where Arseny “Motorola” Pavlov’s “Sparta Battalion” took its symbol from. Resolving the issue of Bibliotekar’s identity would also settle some of the central questions surrounding the downing of MH17.
  • It is unclear exactly what Dubinsky refers to when he says only “those who came back,” but it is possible that he is referring to the fighters in Girkin’s ranks who came back from Sloviansk about two weeks before the downing of MH17. These men would likely have more fighting experience than those who had only been in Donetsk and nearby cities.
  • The people described by Dubinsky are likely those who followed Buk 332 in the escort from Donetsk to Snizhne, though not all of these vehicles were still in the convoy by the time it reached Snizhne. For example, in the Makiivka video from around 11:00am, the escort vehicles include a black Peugeot 3008, a UAZ-469 jeep, a grey 2010 Toyota RAV4 with a modified spoiler, and a dark blue Volkswagen minivan. In the Snizhne video, shot just a few hours before the downing, only one vehicle is still escorting the Buk.
  • There are two “Pervomayskoe” villages located next to each other, and just down the road from the location where Buk 332 launched the missile that downed MH17. One village, closest to the launch site, is “Pervomaysky,” while another village just one field to the north is “Pervomayske.” It is unclear which one Dubinsky was talking about, but a separatist checkpoint was located in between Pervomaysky and the launch location, likely indicating that this was the village he had in mind.
  • The identity of Gyurza is not entirely clear, as it is a common call sign for soldiers. He was likely Dubinsky’s deputy in the DNR’s intelligence service. Novaya Gazeta reported in 2015 that Gyurza was a former French foreign legionnaire, but this claim has not been independently confirmed.

Summary of the fifth call:

The fifth and final call, from the late afternoon or evening of July 17, 2014, is between Dubinsky and “Botsman,” identified by the SBU as an officer of the Russian GRU. Dubinsky tells Botsman that “we are near Marinovka” and things are not going too well. He says that things aren’t so great because they are under constant Grad fire, and that they had recently shot down a Ukrainian Su-25 jet. He mentions that his forces received a Buk-M that morning and that things will be easier now. Dubinsky goes on to say that Ukrainians are trying to escape from Zelenopolye, but to break through they have to go through Dubinsky and his forces. He also mentions that “yesterday” (July 16) they shot down two Su-25s, and another today. At the end of the call, Dubinsky says that “in a couple of hours” he’s headed to Donetsk, and that three Gvozdikas are waiting for him in Donetsk. He will then take the Gvozdikas back to “here” (Marinovka).

Analysis

  • The time of the call is given as 9:08am and Dubinsky is described as in Donetsk–both of which are clearly false. The SBU almost certainly copied the top part of the first call for making the introduction frame for this call, only changing “Buryatik” for “Botsman”. Dubinsky describes his current location as Marinovka in this call, and the call was conducted after the morning and a shootdown with the Buk. The exact time of the call is unclear, but was likely in the late afternoon or very early evening soon after the downing of MH17, but before it became widely known that a passenger jet was actually downed.
  • The identity of Botsman has never been determined, but Dubinsky describes a series of men who used the call sign in a September 13, 2015 post on Glav.su. He mentions a Botsman who was a deputy to Bezler, another who was the deputy commander of the 3rd Brigade from Horlivka, and a third in the “Viking” battalion of the DNR. Of these three, the first is the most likely candidate for the person on the call.
  • There was indeed a large-scale battle near Marinovka shortly before the downing of MH17. On July 16, the day before the downing, a video appeared showing Igor “Strelkov” Girkin and Aleksandr Borodai in a field just northwest of Stepanivka, speaking about the fighting near Marinovka. A Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile system is visible in the video. Separatist forces moved into Marinovka during the day of July 17, and reportedly captured at least a portion of the village on the 16th.

  • The shot down and damaged jets described to Dubinsky can be partially identified. He mentions downing two “Sushkas” (Su-25 jets) the day before the call. On July 16 at around 1pm, two Su-25s were hit, but only one was actually downed. Reports from separatist sources on that day indicate that the Su-25s were bombing near Savur-Mohyla– just a few kilometers from the eventual MH17 launch site, Marinovka, and the location where Strelkov conducted an interview with an anti-aircraft missile system in the background. Dubinsky was mistaken about the third “Sushka” that was shot down on the day of the call, as it was not a fighter jet he had first thought. The only plane that was shot at or downed that day was Malaysian Airlines Flight 17.
  • We are able to identify the three Gvozdikas that Dubinsky mentions: three unnumbered and unmarked 2S1 Gvozdikas that travelled from Luhansk to Donetsk on July 15, 2014. A convoy accompanying these three Gvozdikas was filmed and photographed numerous times, as described in this Bellingcat investigation. These three Gvozdikas were seen on July 15 in central Donetsk around 7:00pm. Three of the same vehicles in this July 15 convoy–an UAZ-469, a 2010 Toyota RAV4, and a dark blue Volkswagen minivan–were in the convoy on July 17 that accompanied Buk 332 through eastern Ukraine. Dubinsky likely left Marinovka in the evening of July 17 — soon after the shootdown of MH17, judging from his comment on shooting down a new “Sushka” — and took his three Gvozdikas from Donetsk to Marinovka that night. Witness reports indicate that three Gvozdikas moved eastward from Donetsk in the late evening of July 17 and early morning of July 18:

“About 15 minutes ago, three Gvozdikas passed through the center of Makiivka in the direction of Khartsyzka. #stopterror” (Archived)

About 45 minutes later, seemingly the same convoy moved through Zuhres, headed eastward along the same route that the MH17 convoy travelled.

A convoy of heavy equipment is headed towards Shakhtarsk, but it’s hard to tell what’s all in it from the darkness.”

“#Shakhtersk a convoy of heavy equipment is headed your way, it just passed by Zuhres”

Dubinsky in Additional Calls Published by the JIT

The Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team also published intercepted telephone calls, but with some information censored (names) and other information added. In the first call described here from 9:08am–in which Dubinsky speaks to Buryatik about unloading the Buk–there is an extra segment at the end.

Buryatik tells Dubinsky that “they need some time to take a look at [the Buk].” After this, we can hear some conversation in the background. Dubinsky seems to be receiving information in the background here regarding the destination of the Buk, and says “wait a second, Bibliotekar.” It is not entirely clear, but it seems as if Bibliotekar may have been in the same room as Dubinsky during this call at 9:08am on the morning of July 17. Considering how Dubinsky mentioned Bibliotekar in a call to Sanych soon after this one, it is logical to conclude that he received information on where to haul the Buk from Bibliotekar.

The JIT published additional phone calls between separatists that took place the morning after the downing, but the identities of those in the call were not formally established.

Aftermath

Following the downing of MH17, Russian/separatist forces scrambled to retrieve the black boxes from MH17. They did eventually find them and on July 2;1, 2014 handed them over in a press conference to Malaysian officials.

In an intercepted call from July 18, 2014 and released by the SBU on July 21, the head of the Vostok Battalion, Aleksandr Khodakovsky, speaks with a separatist soldier about retrieving key items from the MH17 crash site.

While still searching for the black boxes (Khodakovsky later mentions not knowing what they look like), he mentions that Khmuryi (Dubinsky) has a “key item,” which could be a black box.

It is unclear what this item was, but it is clear that Sergey Dubinsky was a key organizer in efforts to find materials related to MH17 at the crash site–with an emphasis that people from “Moscow” want them secured, and that these items “do not come into somebody else’s hands.”

This article was collaboratively researched and written by the Bellingcat  MH17 Investigation Team, with contributions from the Conflict Intelligence Team.

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140 Comments

  1. Cody Johnson Jr

    How about the intercept presented by Ukraine purpoting to be about Cossacks in Chernukhino shooting down MH17?

    What real event did that correspond to?

    Reply
  2. ttb

    Okay will try again -can’t seem to reply in discussion with Stranger. Delete as necessary please mods.
    …so here goes.
    @Rob @Stranger Sorry, been away for a week. Vadim Lukashevich’s comment about an arrest at Dnipro airport on Thursday July 17th is reported on the website whathappenedtoMH17 (I removed the link as it wasn’t allowing me post it for some possibly technical reason) but is, so far as I am aware, uncorroberated. I find it interesting and worth further investigation for reasons touched upon in the article -namely it would help explain why seperatists or their supporters were making specific reference to an An26 in social media posts in the immediate aftermath of the shootdown when the chances of the aircraft type having been confirmed visibly by those pulling the trigger/pushing the button are probably ome way less than 50%. It could also go some way to explaining why they fired at that moment when they’d been sitting in a field for 2-3 hours. But I afford it no more weight than that until corroberating evidence emerges.

    @Stranger -I’ve read the DSB report. The Ukrainians were operating in a fluid situation and reacting to emerging information like everyone else. They knew the seperatists had access to, or were being facilitated with, bigger boys toys earlier that week when they lost an An26 that was cruising above 20,000ft. They may not have known exactly what system or piece of gear was being used. Thereafter they not only raised the cruise altitude for commercial traffic to 32,000ft -they went on TV and explained why they were doing so. Now, if they did that as part of some grand scheme to frame Russia well then they have a degree of cunning, aforethought and tactical nous which frankly they have displayed virtually nowhere else in this conflict.

    Reply
    • stranger

      Probably they have a censorship on their competitor site whathappened2MH17, they don’t want people to discuss their competitors at their forum, even though that site is very curious and less politicized.
      The Hypothesis on a disinformation from Ukrainian side according to fictive An26 as a provocation to target a civil plane is interesting and worth taking into account, but yet weakly supported by facts. That would explain something.
      They raised the no flight altitude because they suspected the rebels to have bigger toys. Also I swear I saw mentioning if even 2 buks in the possession of separatists on the Ukrainian military spokesman Lysenko’s dayly ATO briefing around 14-16-17 of July, but I cannot find it now, so don’t insist yet. Russian TV publically announced in advance the rebels have a Buk!
      Ukraine probably didn’t want to loose transit money by closing the sky completely, so commercial alts were left open until the catastrophe, and closed only afterwards. As for Malasia, they didn’t even see any warnings at all, since according to DSB report, they used an automated system to trace the flight route, which just technically didn’t trigger on the closing lower alt. The route of MH17 that day was unusually too elevated to the north due to the closed sky above Crimea and the weather conditions. In addition the MH17 diverted slightly even more to the north to pass over a thunderstorm and took E-SE and SE direction from Ukrainian controlled territory to the rebels controlled, like a military transport would likely take.
      As for they went on TV to explain why, how did they explain that, did they mention Buk? There are a lot of different institutions and people in Ukraine. Some might honestly think on flight safety, others might want to frame the rebels, Ukraine is not like a single entity acting for a single purpose.

      Reply
      • ttb

        “Probably they have a censorship on their competitor site whathappened2MH17” -Now you’re either joking or just being silly. I found this site exactly because BC tweeted a link to their investigation into the origin of the “we warned you stay out of our skies” posts and commended them for their efforts in doing so.

        Reply
        • stranger

          Ok, give your explanation why the link to that site doesn’t pass through their automated filters in contrast to other links?

          Reply
          • ttb

            What makes you think I’d know why it doesn’t work? Take it up with a mod. At a glance there are links in the comments on this article alone to youtube, NYT, UkraineAtWar, and likely others who who could be seen as in broad agreement or utterly hostile to Bellingcat. If the link won’t work or won’t post it’s at least as likely because I’m doing something wrong OR there’s a glitch in the comment section code OR there’s a dodgy script running somewhere. Like I said -Bellingcat shared the link to the WhatHappenedToMH17 article.

          • stranger

            You can always slightly modify the URL or keywords so that it passes their censorship filter.

          • Cody Johnson Jr

            bellingcat can link to other blogs as much as they want. it adds nothing to their credibilty. blogs are not journalism.

  3. Rob

    Cody, the “separatists” in Ukraine are really no more than “actors” in the “theatre” that is Donbass. While the Russian military does all the shooting, they are supposed to claim credit for the military successes, and blame the rest on Ukraine.

    Look, Russia knows that these “separatists” are wire tapped, so they just let them speak the things they want Ukraine (and us) to believe : That the “separatists” have control over a BUK, and that a “spotter” instructed the “separatists” and the BUK crew to fire a missile.

    Yet in reality, it is highly unlikely that Bezler actually instructed the BUK crew, and highly unlikely that another “spotter” detected MH17 at a target, it is much more likely that the Russian military was in full control all the time, and just instructed “Naimanets” to call Bezler when they were about to launch the futile missile…

    Reply
    • stranger

      Rob, you are quick on conclusions absolutely not supported by any evidences or facts.

      Reply
    • Cody Johnson Jr

      so you tell me Rob. But ive studied the conflict myself for years and don’t believe you.

      Reply
    • Rob

      I challenge you to argue with reason, not “belief”.
      Let’s take this slow :

      If “Naimanets” was a real spotter, and Bezler was in the chain of command, then (as I explained before) there was not enough time between their conversation (“birdie flying your way”) and the BUK crew firing the missile. Bezler would have to be in direct contact with the BUK crew in Snizhne. However, Bezler was in command of Horlivka, not Snizhne. Also, if he were in direct contact with the BUK crew, then why does he give credit to “miner’s group” ?
      This means Bezler was NOT in the chain of command.

      How about another spotter ?
      Since there were some 150 planes that flew over Donbass that day. there was statistically speaking less than 1% chance that another spotter detected the exact same plane that “Naimanets” detected.

      That means the BUK crew was highly unlikely to have been directed by a spotter (“Naimanets” or any other).

      That means the BUK was highly likely directed by a (Russian) BUK command vehicle, and the “Naimanets” call was initiated deliberately to imply that the “separatists” were involved.

      You can still decide not to believe this, but you can no longer decide that you did not know.

      Reply
      • Cody Johnson Jr

        The simplest explanation is that the Bezler/Naimanets conversation is not from 17th July.

        Reply
        • Rob

          That one does not make any sense.
          It implies that Ukraine did not have any evidence that a “spotter” was involved in the MH17 downing, but that Ukraine fabricated evidence for that.
          It suggests that Ukraine risked their credibility of being honest, and that they did so within hours of the disaster.
          And all that just so they would promote a theory that MH17 was a colossal f**k-up by “separatists”, while they actually stated that MH17 was a deliberate act of terrorism. It borders on the ludicrous that Ukraine would do that.

          So, the “Naimanets” call was likely genuine and placed 2 minutes before MH17 went down on July 17.

          Reply
          • Cody Johnson Jr

            What Ukraine did was present fragments of calls already intercepted prior to 17th July.

            We know that MH17 was not shot down from Chernukhino, but the SBU presented this recording anyway and claimed it referred to MH17.

          • Rob

            Nice red herring, Cody.

            I outlined using evidence and reason and logic that the “Naimanets” call was initiated deliberately to imply that the “separatists” were involved, and the BUK at Snizhne was highly likely directed by a (Russian) BUK command vehicle.

            Which totally changes the picture from what MSM are telling us.

            So please argue with reason, instead of changing the subject.

  4. actor

    Using fasict fake telephonate and some word of “actor” is too poor to said who ich fabricated chmurny. :)so no proof by prokijev belicant

    Where is photo abot fasict buk in zacharcevovo in day of tragedy when ukraine regime start anti arcraft excercise but ukraine oposition has no plane:)

    Reply
  5. Cody Johnson Jr

    So MH17 was not shot down from Chernukhino, but the SBU supposed wiretap falsely presented that case. What am I not understanding?

    By the way, how is the Bellingcat fundraiser going? Hope you’ve donated.

    Reply
    • stranger

      “All or nothing. This project will only be funded if it reaches its goal by Thu, April 6 2017 2:29 AM EDT.”
      Uh-oh

      Reply
  6. Joerg Heinrich

    The Photo on top of this article ist falsified — more to the point the person on the left (right to dubinsky) is clear and easy recognizable “photoshopt” (maybe some more ist photoshopt but better done).

    If you look at the neck of the left person with a magnification of 6 times or higher, so the neck will cover a large part of your monitor.

    You ca see a “white cut” from the white background into the neck that is anatomically impossible, and can not be part of a authentic photo.

    It is clear the result of some kind of manipulation, maybe someone copied the head of the left person into the picture an had “problems” with the white background.

    And when the photos are manipulated — why shut i trust the rest?

    Reply
    • Aric Toler

      Then take it up with Dubinsky, as he’s the one who published the photo on his OK profile.
      (it’s likely a photograph of a photograph, btw)

      Reply
      • Joerg Heinrich

        @ Aric Toler

        send the link to primary source — you say the Photo is form Dubinsky — show it.

        Reply
      • Joerg Heinrich

        One other photo also seem falsified.

        In this photo:
        https://017qndpynh-flywheel.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/khmury_porechenkov.jpg

        for you site at:

        https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/02/15/identifying-khmuryi-the-major-general-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/

        The area between Mikhail Porechenkov and Dubinsky looks like stong use of
        Gaussian smoothing the photo overall is sharp.

        And there are no artefacts from jpeg compressen visible — that can correspond to the blur.

        And apart from from details that look “photoshop-falsified” ,
        if an high-rankt russian officer shoot visit Donezk in autumn an winter 2014 .

        Do you think he is dress t with his “all-day-office-uniform”? — not civil or his combat utility uniform ?

        This all does not make sense — even the t-shirts in the photos are odd — its december — you say.

        Reply
        • Aric Toler

          Again, take it up with Dubinsky. The photos are straight from his OK page. And the people in these photos have said that they did indeed meet with him in Donetsk at the time the photos indicate. If you want to take a shot at us, try harder.

          Reply
          • Joerg Heinrich

            Did you personaly download the Photos from Dubinskys account?

            The accout on OK ist open for friends only — there are 104 “friends” of Dubinskys and i dont expect you to be one of them.

            What is the your source?

          • Joerg Heinrich

            The picture with a resolution of 1024 an a size of 79kbyte seems downscaled.

            The compression-artefacts on the text left and right are different what sems odd to me.

            For taking as screenshot i expect you to use of PNG in 1:1 size, oder Browser-Print to PDF.

            Please show your original screenshot without (or with less) compresion-artefacts on the text.

            Or show what ever is your “original” file.

          • Joerg Heinrich

            ELA (http://fotoforensics.com/) and the jpg-artefacts (simple zoom) look like that on the photo with Dubinsky and Porechenkov the left side text with date an place is falsified.

            ELA and the jpg-artefacts look like that on the photo with Dubinsky and Okhlobystin, the right side text with the basic personal information seems falsified.

            I do not trust much in ELA-Analysis — and i am shure the pictures are donwscaled, clipped and compressd parts of the “original”.

            I expect you to reveal their original, in the form of a link to the original pictures.

            Also, I expect the same as they came to the pictures, even on the OK page or a colleague or a third source?

            I do not believe that Dubinsky falsifies photo proofs against himself.

            I do not believe that Bellingcat falsifies photo proof, not yet.

            Please show your originals — your credibility depends on it

          • Joerg Heinrich

            If you don not reveal the “original” screenshots i have to assume you did not personaly have make them in okt 2016.

            I assume the “so called screenshots” are “web-founds” or an annonymous “tip”.

            And if i am right –it seems that someone is messing around with you (or Bellingcat), giving Belingcat false information and falsified “photos” — hoping that you post them (and was right).

            Check your source an tell about it!

          • Aric Toler

            Okhlobystin himself acknowledged the picture and wrote an op-ed in RT talking about how he visited Dubinsky. You’re either really dense or haven’t done enough research into this. Either way, you’re Don Quixote going against windmills with this argument.

      • Joerg Heinrich

        (it’s likely a photograph of a photograph, btw)

        1.) today there are no “real photographs” on paper any more.
        A photograph of a photograph does not make sense today.

        2.) An a photograph of a photograph can be the cause of some stains oder small dots — some blur maybe.
        But not for this “cut” in the neck with a soft gradation that look like the use of gaussian smoothing after copying something into a photo.

        Reply

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