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New Evidence Links Russian State to Berlin Assassination

September 27, 2019

By Bellingcat Investigation Team

Translations: Русский

Joint investigation by Bellingcat, Der Spiegel, the Insider and the Dossier Center.

  • In the first part of this joint investigation, we disclosed that the assassin of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili detained by German police traveled on a valid Russian passport issued under the fake identity of “Vadim Sokolov”. We concluded that the usage of a validly issued passport in the name of a non-existent person indicated a link between the assassin and the Russian state.
  • Interim reporting by Der Spiegel and other media has disclosed that the suspect initially traveled from Moscow to Paris and then on to Warsaw, where he rented a hotel room for five days during which he traveled on to Berlin – suggesting he initially intended to return to Warsaw following the Berlin operation.
  • In the interim, we have obtained information that a Russian-issued SIM card was found at “Sokolov”’s hotel room in Warsaw. German and Polish investigators are reportedly analyzing the data linked to that SIM card.
  • In a report from 26 September 2019, the New York Times (NYT) reported that German investigators received a tip from an anonymous source claiming the suspect’s real identity is that of Vladimir Stepanov, a former police officer from St. Petersburg who in 2006 was convicted and sentenced to 24 years in jail for being part of an organized crime group that murdered two people at the orders of a business rival. The NYT quotes a Western intelligence agency as giving credence to the tip, and the NYT partially corroborates this hypothesis by referring to a facial recognition analysis that compared media photographs of Stepanov from the time of his court proceedings to the German police-issued killer’s photograph. German police are cited as yet-undetermined whether Vladimir Stepanov is in fact the person behind the Vadim Sokolov persona. The NYT report did not put its weight behind the hypothesis that Stepanov is Sokolov, but did introduce the mysterious, anonymous tip to the public.

Contrary to the findings of the unnamed Western agency, Bellingcat and its investigative partners Der Spiegel, The Insider and The Dossier Center have concluded that the suspect held by German police is unlikely to be Vladimir Stepanov. This conclusion is based on a weeks-long investigation that analyzed – and ultimately rejected – the hypothesis that the killer and the former police major serving a 24-year sentence are the same person. The same finding was reached independently by the Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka, who claim in September 26 report that Vladimir Stepanov remains in a Russian prison.

In the process of this investigation, Bellingcat and its partners have obtained conclusive evidence that the suspect – whose real identity is still being sought by our team – traveled to Berlin under a cover identity with the active support of the Russian state that created a comprehensive, back-dated paper-trail for this fictitious persona in order to help him obtain the necessary travel and insurance documents, and – crucially – a Schengen visa. These findings preclude the hypothesis that this was an organized crime operation, or even a semi-official operation that received only limited support from individual corrupt officials.

A false lead

Within hours of our initial report that included the first published photograph of the detained hitman, Bellingcat was contacted by an anonymous source who – based on the NYT’s description – appears to be the same source who provided the tip to the German law enforcement, and possibly to Western intelligence agencies. The source believed they had visually identified the suspect as Vladimir Stepanov, the convicted former policeman, and provided information on the place where Stepanov was supposed to be serving the last decade of his long prison sentence. This was the 11th Penal Colony (or IK-11), located in the Russian town of Bor in the Nizhny Novgorod District, about 300 kilometers east of Moscow. This prison’s population includes convicted former law enforcement or intelligence officers, and its walls have seen the likes of both dirty cops and killers and high-profile spies, such as at least 2 former intelligence officers who were exchanged during the notorious 2010 spy-swap case involving ten Russian illegals working in deep cover in the United States.

Over the following weeks, Bellingcat and its investigative partners comprehensively assessed the veracity of this mysterious tip. Despite some early corroborating evidence, for example Stepanov’s similar age, a full match of initials, and a number of striking facial similarities, we ultimately concluded that Sokolov and Stepanov are not the same person.

To reach this conclusion, we initially scoured through hundreds of pages and hours of open source data for a photograph or video clip showing Stepanov. Despite the significant coverage of the high-profile court case in 2005 and 2016 (one of the assassinated businessman was the CEO of Almaz-Antey, Russia’s state-owned monopolist in the production of the Buk anti-aircraft defense system that shot down MH17, and who was reportedly a close personal friend of Vladimir Putin), we were unsuccessful in finding a high-quality photograph of Stepanov allowing forensic comparison.

We then obtained a copy of Vladimir Stepanov’s passport file from a source with access to Russia’s central passport database. It contained two photographs – one taken when Stepanov was 20, and the latter taken around the time he turned 45 (in 2016), as at that age Russian citizens must obtain a new passport.

While visually there are certain similarities between Stepanov’s passport photos and that of “Sokolov”, we could not establish an unequivocal match. Bellingcat then referred the photographs for comparison to Dr. Hassan Ugail, professor of Visual Computing at the School of Engineering Bradford University. Prof. Ugail specializes in facial recognition and age progression simulation techniques.  Prof. Ugail’s determination was that Stepanov and “Sokolov” were two different persons.

“Vadim Sokolov” can be seen on the left and right portions of this matrix (color photographs 1 and 3), and Vladimir Stepanov is on the top and bottom (black and white photographs 2 and 4). Results matrix provided by Prof. Ugail of Bradfort University

In order to further validate this finding, we sought other sources who were familiar with Vladimir Stepanov. We identified and contacted two former police officers from St. Petersburg who served jail time at the same prison outside of Nizhny Novogrod until recently, and whom we assumed might know Stepanov. Both confirmed that they knew Stepanov well – one said Stepanov had been his suborinate – and recognized him on the black & white passport photographs seen above, but not on the photograph of the bearded/mustachioed assassin. Both of these acquaintances of Stepanov also told us that according to the latest information they have, Stepanov was still serving his sentence at the Bor correctional facility. One of the two sources also told us that Vladimir Stepanov never had any tattoos – contrary to the information from German law enforcement sources that “Sokolov” has tattoos on both arms.

Seeking an additional source of validation, our investigative team then established contact with an officer working at the Bor prison facility. This source confirmed to us that Stepanov – as of mid-September 2019 – was still serving time there. This information has been corroborated by a Fontanka report. At our request, the source even took a photograph of Stepanov walking in the prison’s courtyard. Based on comparison to public videos and documentaries about this prison, we were able to geolocate the courtyard as belonging to the IK-11 facility. The images’ metadata also are consistent with the reported timestamp of capturing the photograph in the middle of September.

Based on all of this objective and subjective evidence, we have concluded that it is unlikely that Stepanov is the real person behind the fictitious “Sokolov” persona.

Our assumption for the false-positive match provided by the facial comparison commissioned by NYT is that the source photo of Stepanov used by the researcher is only of a part of a face, and is not facing the camera. A partial face compared to a full (frontal) face is much more likely to produce a false positive than full-face comparison. In addition, individual feature comparison suggests that the 2006 photograph discovered by NYT (middle) bears more similarity with Stepanov’s passport photo (on the left) than with that of “Sokolov” (on the right)

Left: Vladimir Stepanov in an old passport photograph. Middle: Vladimir Stepanov in court. Right: “Vadim Sokolov” shortly after his arrest in Berlin.

To preclude a false negative assessment, our team obtained Stepanov’s criminal record which includes a unique fingerprint formula. This record would arguably make it possible for German law enforcement to compare the formula to the fingerprint data from the actual suspect.

An honest mistake or a red herring?

We are not able to assess if the mysterious tip by the anonymous source was earnest confusion or part of a ruse to sidetrack the investigation and/or discredit investigative media, such as Bellingcat, or intelligence services by coaxing them to publish demonstrably false conclusions. If Bellingcat or another media outlet were to accuse Stepanov of being Sokolov, Russian authorities could easily produce Stepanov — something they have not done with any of the other GRU officers we have unmasked, including Oleg Ivannikov, Anatoliy Chepiga, and Aleksandr Mishkin. We are unable to determine how and why a Western intelligence agency may have concluded that the hypothesis provided by the anonymous source is credible, given our own findings within a relatively short period of time.

Evidence of a state-endorsed operation

In our previous report we based our assessment that “Sokolov”’s operation was highly likely state-sponsored on the fact that he was issued a valid, fully registered international travel passport in the name of a non-existing actual person, and was able to cross the Russian border, suggesting his fake identity was also entered into the central passport database. Further, following the arrest his data was removed from the passport database, which – as well as the issuance of the passport – could not have happened without state involvement.

Our additional investigation has found that the involvement of the Russian state in creating a documentary footprint for the non-existent identity of “Vadim Andreevich Sokolov” is more wide-spread and comprehensive than previously thought. Based on this additional evidence, the concept that this operation may have been set up without the full endorsement of the state apparatus is implausible.

Our investigative team followed the chain of steps that “Sokolov” needed to go through before obtaining the coveted Schengen visa that would allow him to travel initially to Paris, and then onward via Warsaw to his ultimate destination in Berlin. Then, we made an inventory list of documents and paperwork he would have needed at each step.

As reported in our first publication, “Sokolov” received an international non-biometric passport issued on 18 July 2019, and applied for a Schengen visa on 29 July 2019. In order for him to apply for a visa, this fictitious person would have needed to have the following:

  • A domestic passport and an entry in the Russia passport database. The domestic passport is needed as a precondition for obtaining the international travel passport. It is also a necessary requirement for creating a job “footprint” (see below)
  • Proof of employment, typically in the form of a certificate of employment
  • Bank statement showing sufficiency of funds
  • Travel insurance

A tax identification number for a non-existent man

As we reported previously, two sources with access to the Russia passport database had found no entry for Vadim Sokolov as of early September – after the murder and the arrest of the suspect. We assumed that the Russia passport database had been purged of his data following the murder. However, we also hypothesized that “Sokolov”s passport data may have remained intact in other government databases that may not have (yet) been purged by the Russian authorities. We decided that a good candidate for a database with a forgotten digital footprint would be the tax database. In order for “Sokolov” to show proof of employment to the French consulate, he would have had to be formally (fictionally) employed, most likely by a cutout company used by Russia’s secret services. However, any employment, fictional or not, would lead to mandatory tax registration.

From a source with access to tax records, we were able to obtain a copy of “Vadim Sokolov”’s tax file. As expected, it had not been purged, and contained strong evidence of a freshly-created fictitious persona.

“Vadim Sokolov” was first entered into the Russian tax system on 16 June 2019, and received a tax identification number (INN in Russian) the first time on 23 July 2019 – just five days after the issuance of his international travel passport, and six days before he applied for a visa. Notably, Sokolov received a tax ID number for the first time at age 49. While receiving a tax ID number is not technically mandatory in Russia, a tax registration is automatically triggered by any employment, thus implying that “Sokolov” was first gainfully employed at age 49.

The tax registration, as predicted, also included a domestic passport number for “Sokolov”. This passport was allegedly issued in 2015. Using the passport data in this tax report, we were able to validate its authenticity by entering “Sokolov”’s passport data into the Russian state-run online tax ID validation tool. Based on the passport number, name and date of birth, the tool reported a valid INN number which was the same as the one on the report we had obtained. Thus, effectively “Sokolov” appeared as a valid Russian citizen in one government-run database (the tax registry), while missing completely in another (the passport database).

Our attempts to find any trace of the 2015 passport number listed in the tax record in dozens of Russian databases – including in 2016 and 2018 editions of a comprehensive database of Moscow residents – returned empty results. As the passport number was (allegedly) issued in Moscow, if it had existed as of 2015 it would have shown up in both of these databases. We also tested for the possibility that “Sokolov” may have obtained a passport in Moscow while not being resident there. To this end we searched for his name and birthdate – with any passport number – in several thousands of regional databases leaked over the past 20 years. None of them had an entry for this parrticular “Sokolov”, Notably, these leaked offline databases, which cannot be modified by Russian authorities, include even the fake identities of Skripal poisoning suspects, GRU officers Col. Chepiga and Mishkin. This fact suggests the passport was created in 2019 and “retrofitted” to appear as if issued in 2015.

Having obtained this passport number, we asked one of the sources with access to the real-time Russia passport system to search for it in the database. The source reported that this passport entry was marked with a disclaimer “A person protected by law…To obtain this file, contact an administrator”.

As we have previously reported, several persons who have long worked with the Russia passport database have informed us that such “firewalling” of certain sensitive passport dossiers was introduced for the first time after Bellingcat’s explosive reports identifying the Skripal suspects. Indeed, during our early investigations into the identities of the three GRU officers implicated in the Skripal poisoning, no such firewalls existed, while in later periods our sources were no longer able to access these same passport files, with similar disclaimers appearing in their place.

“No Such Person Here”

The tax file contained another interesting lead: a registered residential address for “Vadim Sokolov”. Unlike the (non-existent) address in St. Petersburg that “Sokolov” claimed in his visa application, the one in his tax record was in Bryansk, a town in western Russia near the border with Belarus.

We obtained an official real estate record for this address, but, unusually, it contained no ownership data. Our collaborative investigative team dispatched a reporter to the stated address and found a run-down house. None of the people at this address knew of a Vadim Sokolov. The person living in the apartment listed in “Sokolov”’s tax file, a man in his eighties, said he does not know of a person by that name, nor if such a person ever lived at that address.

In previous investigations of undercover operatives in Russia, we have come across other “cover” residential addresses that are actually used by elderly people who may or may not be aware of the alternate “on-paper” residents in their apartments.

A missing employee

The employer “Sokolov” listed on his visa application document – and had to provide a certificate of employment with – was a St. Petersburg company called ZAO “RUST”. This is a construction company with a long history, but limited digital footprint. The company’s listed fixed-line phone number is the same as the number listed by a company wholly owned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, but we were not able to establish if the number was used concurrently or at different times.

Our team contacted the CEO of the company, who denied having employed or issued a certificate of employment to Vadim Sokolov. Furthermore he claimed that the company was in reorganization and could not have issued an employment certificate in recent months, as it conducts no economic activity. Still, he promised our reporter to look at the company’s records and inform us if a Vadim Sokolov has ever been employed by RUST. Thereafter, he switched off his phone and has not responded to our repeated attempts to reach him.

While “Sokolov”’s real identity is yet unknown and is the object of our ongoing investigation, our findings so far provide overwhelming evidence that the arrested assassin acted with the full support of the Russian state. The issuance of an array of documents to a fictitious person with no historical evidence of existence – including a last-minute entry into the tax database shortly before his trip to Germany – would not be possible without the direct involvement of a state apparatus. Even less plausible is the ability of a non-state actor to “firewall” the data on a Russian passport behind a disclaimer known to be used to protect personal data relating to undercover special service operatives.

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77 Comments

  1. Mr.Bushkin

    Face #4 reminds me of Saakashvili.

    Looks like a bunch of fake news providers investigating their own intellectual excrements to me, aside of that.

    Reply
    • Rob

      @hotzl Can you be more specific about the parts you disagree with and provide your reasoned argument against please?

      Reply
      • Mr.Bushkin

        Rob, I’d not waste my time with the whataboutism of the common associal scum dwelling on the internet.

        Reply
        • Gerhard

          Looks like the St. Petersburg troll farm is now hard at work on Bellingcat comments. Perhaps admin could collect the IPs for distribution to Western intelligence? May be handy to add to database in preparation for 2020 operations.

          Mr. Bushkin, et al., the more you post the easier you make it for services to track your troll farm activity. Congratulations at least on your employment, as it appears that wasting your life away with illiterate gibberish based on FSB talking points probably pays better than most occupations in your failing economy.

          Reply
    • Aleks

      It’s a very satisfactory feeling, to know that no one has to give a sh*t what things look like to you and other trolls.
      Thanks to bellingcat for the thorough report.

      Reply
    • Servus

      The promptness, emotions and vulgarity of this troll’s entry clearly shows that Russians are getting nervous.

      One can expect avalanche of standard «nonsen , don’t agree » postings, taken from their standard « deny «  or « insult » library.

      It’s still unclear how German authorities will react, Litvinienko’s case should be a warning, if you don’t react and show resolve, the gangsters will push further and test the limits, this is what they always do.

      Nice to see that Mr B. stopped to have the paranoiac associations with a 122mm pipe though.

      Reply
        • Gerhard

          How about you people do something useful for Bellingcat and post an org chart of your office, personnel, workflow, and reporting hierarchy before they or Western intelligence get to you first? Your office has already been exposed on multiple sites, so why not save everyone the trouble? Go study to become a real hacker or something like your compatriots in real intelligence departments. Or if you can’t cut it at a real position that requires an education go work at a convenience store and leave our countries alone. Even mainstream media is on to this line of nonsense already..it’s tiresome.

          Reply
          • Wladimir k

            Hör auf hier scheiße zu erzählen du depp. Die IP kann man verstecken über Tor d.h deine IP kann auch in Polen sein. Beste Grüße aus Karlsruhe und nicht St. Petersburg. Schwachmatt euch Ratten müsste man prügeln bis ihr im Rollstuhl hockt. Im Netz habt ihr alle dicke Eier.

          • Servus

            The IP addresses are most likely thouse of ´anonymous proxies’, placed a little bit everywhere in the Internet but …, many are run as ´honey pots’ by the three letter agencies or owners are by law obliged to provide all logs and mappings… and base design was done by US naval research… so as usual, only we the public is knows nothing…

          • Mr.Bushkin

            Gerhard, if you leak my eggs, then perhaps. But do not consider it being a promise.

          • Mr.Bushkin

            But anyway, a LOL in advance at the brabbling morons, which will fail to bring it on. 😀

          • Gerhard

            German BND, see below. It appears you have active FSB assets operating in Karlsruhe. Thanks, Wladimir! I’m sure the NSA and friends have ways to work around Tor.

    • cia

      it is him a Russian spy, one of many the old Kgb released to work for tge russian state more to be exposed and killed. 21 located in usa ready for execution

      Reply
      • Wladimir K

        @Gerhard listen to me cuntface who cares who has tor or not. Nobody just stuipid assholes like. A once you should. If it comes for a fight you need a lot of muscles. What Russia has a lot. Care about you fucking Arab Cunts in Germany. I dont care about your fucking nsa I am an ordinary guy. Nothing else.

        Reply
      • Wladimir K

        At Gerhard the Cuntface. Halt dein dummes Maul. Hier im Internet habt Ihr Hurensöhne dicke Eier im wahren leben kackt ihr Deutschen euch doch keine Sorge du Dummbatz ich habe die Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Mich interessiert dein Scheiss BND oder deine abgefuckte NSA nicht. Jeder Depp kann sich die IP so einstellen das sie immer von Land zu Land springt und was sollen die pussies vom BND den machen bitte. Nix werden die machen kommt mir am besten mit der scheiße wie lupenreiner Demokrat usw. Euch Trottel nimmt doch einer für voll. Einmal Opfer immer Opfer. Passt lieber auf das ihr von euren Araber Facharbeiter nicht überrannt werdet. Kinder habt ihr ja keine. Nur ihr seit so dumm. Schwuchtel

        Reply
      • Mr.Bushkin

        Wladimir K, a xenophobic lunatic like you would be a good addition for a paranoic lunatic like Gerhard.

        Just go and marry each other. 😀

        Reply
          • Mr.Bushkin

            So, Wladimir K is indeed a fake Russian, who can not write Russian insults properly and makes typical German grammatical misspellings with “seid” and “seit”, see his quote: “[…] seit so dumm. Schwuchtel […]”

            “Schwuchtel” indicates that he is gay, since only more or less latent gays are indifferent towards gays.

          • M

            Servus=Gerhard=WladimirK 🙂 = > One paranoid schizophrenic, who plays the role of 3 different people.

          • Mr.Bushkin

            I do not think so. Gerhard is probably unrelated, but Wladimir K is clearly an imposer, while Servus is a separate conspiracy theoretician.

          • M

            Servus = Gerhard 🙂 for 100 %, he confessed by responding to one of my comments under Servus’s writing as Gerhard.

          • Mr.Bushkin

            In this comment thread it’s also like this with that insulting lunatic:

            1) Mr.Bushkin – September 27, 2019 “Face #4 …”
            2) Servus – September 27, 2019 “The promptness, emotions …”
            3) Mr.Bushkin – September 27, 2019 “Which just underscores …”
            4) Gerhard – September 27, 2019 “How about …”

          • Wladimir K

            @xuyjushkin. Gerhard is on of these paronoid Germans who makes Russian for everything responsible. People like him even support probably the Nazis in Donbass. I know the mentality people like him. They hidding behing the internet but they never ever tell you that in your face. He is a typical German wiener.

          • Mr.Bushkin

            There is nothing about your problems with yourself that can not be solved by a dose of (RS)-4-Amino-N-5-(ethylsulfonyl)-2-methoxybenzamid, dear Servus/Gerhard/Wladimir K. 😀

  2. Make Koñey

    Good work. When I read NY Times ae chrticle it seemed clear the photo of the assassin was to triplnot that of Stepanov even though I’m far from an expert.

    You have to triple check your sources b/c Russia is planting false leads. Anyway to put assassin’s photo in Russian media to see if that’ll lead to ID?

    Reply
  3. Som Ting

    The hit was almost certainly carried on the orders of the CIA but probably carried out to Mossad or even some ISIS lackeys. The German government obviously knows it.

    Reply
    • Boinga

      ..and Kim Jong Un was certainly also involved, as well as Assad. But not Russia, of course not, Putin said he did not do it, so it must be true.

      Reply
      • Som Ting

        You have to look at who benefits. The running dogs of American imperialism have been incessant about the pipeline not being built between Russia and Germany. Germany has rejected US pressure to scrap it. Then some anonymous Russian no one has ever heard of is “assassinated” in Germany by the Russia state……. Really? Russians are very well educated. Far better than in USA or UK for example. In the West only Iceland compares. They are not idiots.

        Reply
        • N. Quirin

          Obviously they did not expect the killer to be catched. And Germany seems to be also not very happy about catching him. Probably because of the reasons you mentioned.

          Reply
        • Tim

          seriously, who still says “running dogs?” as opposed to bushkin, who is serious, ‘som ting’ clearly a just a for the lolz troll.

          Reply
  4. Tracey Thakore

    What if the “assassin” was travelling on a passport issued in the name of a person already registered as deceased?

    Reply
  5. Servus

    That’s an interesting twist, RT could show the grave and claim that it proves that Sokolov could not have murderd anybody because he was not in Berlin. It’s not my hand, said the pickpocket when caught with his hand in someoneelses pocket!

    Let’s see if Russians will follow Tracy’s hint.

    Reply
  6. Phil Otayce

    Dogged, intelligent, articulate investigating. Thanks again to Bellingcat. Putin carries on the grand tradition of Trotsky-hunting on foreign soil. Mr Bone Saw (“MSB”) is just a novice, and our poor Trump, only a wannabe.

    Reply
  7. Jeroen

    “Consular officials of the Russian Embassy in Germany met with the detained citizen at his request and in accordance with Russian legislation and provided all necessary consular and legal assistance to him on August 27,” the diplomatic mission’s press service said.”
    They most probably told him it is to early for him to be rewarded now.

    Well this “Russian citizen” travelling with a passport under the name of “Sokolov” might have been acting according to the law, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament – the Federation Council – approved July 2006, a law which permits the Russian president to use the country’s armed forces and special services outside Russia’s borders to combat terrorism and extremism.

    Moreover the Russian law is very specific in that it permits the president – alone, and apparently without consultation – to take such a decision.
    The only provison is that he must inform the Federation Council within five days.

    Either he did not and broke the law, or he might be suffering from some trumpophobia now, which causes POTUS also to suffer some sleepless moments at night.
    Any whistelblowers considering belling the cat?

    Reply
    • N. Quirin

      Thanks for the nice investigation. In the Insider version there is an additional detail that ‘Sokolov’ is not present in a database of persons who have passed the russian pass control at the airport on the day of the flight to Paris. Do you really have an access to such a database?

      Reply
    • Servus

      Very good question, hope German police goes to the bottom of it and exposes whole support network.

      There are several published books about terrorism in Western Europe in 70-80ties , based on secret police archives from Poland, East German, Hungary etc .
      In one assasination attempt, the reconnaissance was done by basque ETA, weapon supplied by the German Baader-Meinhoff. gang, the attack carried out by a Palestinian that subsequently run and hide in East Europe. All coordinated by the KGB.

      Did FSB/GRU reconstruct such networks, doubtful but they are certainly working on it. This time cooperation comes from extreme right and left.
      One can see it in propaganda space, example: German far right site published fake ´interview’ of a supposed Ukrainian fighter pilot that falsely claimed shooting down the MH17 flight. Would these guys go a step further and provide weapons to a covert operations? Who knows, I doubt it, FSB/GRU would use people that have already killed and that have nothing to lose, not just voilent big mouths.

      So, let’s just wait and see, the trolls nervousness and massive posts could
      be a sign that police starts narrowing on some Russian individuals or institutions…..

      Reply
      • Wladimir K

        Asshole listen to me you should care about the muslim jihhadist in Germany Idiot.
        I dont care about you and all your German Cuntfaces. No one of you will ever fight this is the fucking reality

        Reply
        • Black Star

          Telling someone “I don’t care about you” is probably not a very effective way to convince them about anything.

          Reply
      • Wladimir K

        If you want you can pass the german french border and get an gun from nice Donkey Arabs. I see you are an Idiot

        Reply
        • N. Quirin

          The information amount of your messages is at most zero. Consider a possibility to improve this.

          Reply
        • Servus

          Your personal culture is well matched by the clarity of your argumentation.
          It’s impressive to observe how many sentences you are capable of writing with just 5 foreign words you seem to master.

          Reply

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